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1. Introduction 
 
The goal of this paper is to discuss differences and similarities of European countries and the 
United States with respect to income distribution and the macroeconomic growth 
performance. Our aim is twofold. First, we discuss recent insights from the macroeconomic 
literature on the impact of inequality on the macroeconomic growth performance. Second, an 
attempt is made to use these insights to shed light on recent European and U.S. experiences. 
 
Our focus differs from the recent literature in two important respects. First, the recent 
literature has extensively studied the sources of changes in inequality. Instead, our paper 
turns this question upside down. Rather than looking at the explanations of high and rising 
inequalities, we are posing the question: Are there any feedback effects from high and 
increasing inequalities on the long-run growth process?  
 
In contrast, our paper is concerned with the consequences rather than the causes of 
inequality, so we will look at mechanisms by which income and wealth inequality is 
transmitted to growth outcomes. While, in principle, there may be many such channels, two 
of them seem particularly relevant in the context of recent European and U.S. 
macroeconomic experiences: (i) the effects of inequality on human capital accumulation and 
(ii) the impact of inequality on innovation incentives and price setting behavior.  
 
Imperfections on the capital market are a fundamental problem inherently associated with 
educational choices. By the very nature of educational investments no collateral can be 
offered and the investment returns typically accrue to children who are not legally bound to 
honor the debts of their parents. Clearly, how many individuals will be constrained in their 
educational choices will depend on the income distribution. Many recent theories suggest 
that human capital investments are an important determinant of long run growth rates.  
 
Effects of income distribution transmitted via imperfections in the product market are 
important to understand the incentives to innovate. The income distribution is relevant in this 
respect because the demand for innovators’ products crucially depends on the income 
distribution when the poor do not consume the same goods as the rich. More generally, the 
fact that market demand functions are affected by inequality is most obvious in Engel’s law 
according to which the budget share for food decreases in income. According to this   3
empirical observation, income distribution must play a central role both for the market size 
and price setting behavior of monopolistic firms.
1 Hence income distribution also affects the 
prices and the profits of innovative firms. As innovations are a crucial determinant of 
productivity growth, we can ask how inequality affects growth-outcomes. 
 
Recent empirical evidence suggests, perhaps unsurprisingly, that inequality is higher in the 
U.S. than in almost all European countries. While inequality has been increasing strongly in 
some European countries (in particular, in the U.K.), recent empirical evidence suggests that 
the increase might have been strongest in the U.S., in particular if one takes a closer look a 
the top incomes.  
 
If inequality in Europe is smaller and has been increasing less strongly than in the U.S., what 
are possible implications for relative macroeconomic outcomes? The experience in the very 
recent past suggests the U.S. have done (relatively) better than most European countries. 
Hence, we might be lead to conclude that inequality is a (perhaps) unpleasant but necessary 
precondition for favorable macroeconomic performances. In fact, the existence of such a 
trade-off between equity and efficiency was a dominant proposition that has been held by the 
majority of the economics profession. 
 
The more recent macroeconomic literature, however, has challenged this view both on 
theoretical and on empirical grounds. First, the trade-off has been questioned as a matter of 
fact. There is very little empirical evidence suggesting that higher inequality is favorable for 
the long-run growth experience of an economy. Cross-country data suggest that economies 
with low initial inequality have grown much faster in subsequent decades than high-
inequality countries. The second challenge for the equity-efficiency trade-off view comes 
from the theoretical side. While neoclassical macroeconomics has focused on perfect 
markets, market imperfections are central in more recent theories. When markets 
imperfections are accounted for, income inequality becomes an important determinant of 
macroeconomic outcomes. In fact, in such an imperfect world, it may well be that low-
inequality countries have an advantage in the long-run, as the inefficiencies that result from 
market imperfections will be less severe when incomes are more evenly distributed.  
 
                                                 
1 Technically speaking, income distribution plays a role for market demand curves if consumers have non-
homothetic preferences.   4
The paper is organized as follows. We will start with a review of some empirical facts. In 
Section 2 we discuss differences in income inequality between Europe and the U.S. and look 
at recent trends. We will see that the available evidence supports the view that in the U.S. 
incomes are less evenly distributed than in European countries, and perhaps less unevenly 
than in Europe as a whole. Moreover, this recent evidence suggests that U.S. top incomes 
have been increasing dramatically which may be due to the decline in progressive taxation. It 
is likely that this may foster further the trend towards more inequality in the future.  
 
In Section 3 we contrast these inequality trends to the differences in macroeconomic 
outcomes on the two sides of the Atlantic. We start by reviewing the recent and more long-
term EU and U.S. growth experiences. Perhaps interestingly, and certainly at odds with much 
of the recent public debate, European countries have clearly outperformed the U.S. over the 
longer run in terms of productivity growth.  
 
Section 4 briefly reviews the recent macroeconomic literature on long-run growth and 
income distribution and discusses some theoretical approaches that have put forth to explain 
the evidence. The following sections deal in more detail with potential effects of income 
inequality on human capital accumulation under capital market imperfections (Section 5) and 
with the impact of income inequality on innovation incentives and price-setting behavior 
when there is imperfect competition on product markets (Section 6).  
 
Section 7 summarizes. 
 
 
2.  Differences and trends in income inequality: U.S. versus Europe 
 
In this section we take a look at the empirical evidence on income distribution in the U.S. and 
in Europe. Table 1 shows a recent cross-country comparison among the OECD countries 
based on data from the Luxembourg income studies, the most reliable and informative 
database for cross-country comparisons. Table 1 shows various interesting indicators. One 
such indicator is the Gini coefficient. Comparing this measure across countries confirms 
expectations: income inequality in the U.S. is much higher than in any other country listed in 
Table 1. For instance, the Gini coefficient is 0.37 for the U.S., 0.30 for Germany, and only 
around 0.23 for a typical Nordic country.    5
 
A further interesting inequality indicator is the 90/10 percentile ratio, which is a rough 
measure of the range between the poorest and the richest in a society. For instance, this ratio 
is 6.4 in the U.S., about 3.8 in Germany, and around 2.8 in a typical Nordic country. The bars 
in the middle of Table 1 show this range graphically. The bars show that, relative to the 
median within each country, in the U.S., the poor are poorer and the rich are richer than in 
any other country listed in Table 1.  
 




Source: Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) 
 
Note that Table 1 may give a biased picture about differences in income inequality between 
“Europe” and the U.S. The U.S. encompass different states with rather different per-capita 
income levels that are lumped together. Europe also consists of different countries, but these 
are treated as separate entities in Table 1. In particular, inequality within Europe as a whole 
may be higher once we account for cross-country differences in per-capita incomes. Atkinson 
(1995) made an attempt to estimate the level of inequality of the Europe-wide distribution of 
income. Table 2 reports the numbers.   6
 
 
Table 2: “Europe-wide” and US Distributions: Shares of Total Income 
 
 
     Source: Atkinson (1995) 
 
The set of countries that is included to make these calculations is somewhat selective and 
driven by data availability. But it includes poor countries such as Portugal as well as rich 
countries such as Switzerland and Luxembourg, hence the numbers should come close to the 
measure we are interested in. Table 2 shows that taking account of cross-country income 
differences within Europe does not change the general picture. The U.S. still has the more 
unequal distribution of income. Two points are worth mentioning here. First, the numbers are 
from the mid and late 1980s and probably underestimate the actual differences. This is 
mainly because there has been convergence across countries within Europe, whereas the 
distribution of per capita income across U.S. states has been more stable. Second, the picture 
may be different once we consider also Eastern Europe as these countries consist of large 
populations with low per capita-incomes. 
 
What are the trends in the distribution of income and what are the differences and similarities 
between Europe and the U.S. along this dimension? Is the general perception of a widening 
in the distribution of income actually visible in the data? Again, the cross-country data lag 
behind and the numbers we present refer to changes in inequality between the late 1970s and 
the mid 1990s (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Trends in Disposable Income Inequality Gini Coefficients Percentage 
Change per Year and Absolute Change per Year: 1979 – 1995 
 
 
Source: Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) 
 
Figure 1 shows that rising income inequality is a rather common phenomenon. Interestingly, 
a first look at the data suggests that the countries that experienced the highest increase in 
income inequality are European countries. In the U.K., for instance, the Gini coefficient has 
grown by 8 points from 0.27 in 1979 to 0.34 in 1995 (an increase in measured inequality of 
almost one third!). Inequality has also been strongly increasing in the Netherlands and in 
Sweden, albeit both countries (in particular Sweden) started out from a rather low level of 
inequality. The remaining European countries listed in Figure 1, Switzerland, Germany, 
Norway, experienced a modest increase, whereas in Finland, Ireland, and Italy there was 
even a reduction in inequality.  
 
Evidently, there are pronounced differences in distributional outcomes across European 
countries. In particular, there is not a very clear trend towards increased inequality. In 
contrast, the U.S. clearly experienced an increase in inequality. This increase is modest if 
compared to the one that took place in the U.K. but is of about equal size as the one of the 
Netherlands. In particular, the increase in U.S. inequality is higher than in Germany, France, 
and of course, Italy (which experienced a decline in inequality).  
   8
Note, however, that there are good reasons to believe that the increase in inequality in the 
U.S. may be strongly underestimated. Recent evidence by Piketty and Saez (2003) suggests 
that top incomes in the U.S. have increased substantially during the last 25 years, whereas 
such a development did not take place in Europe. Survey data like the Luxembourg income 
studies do not adequately sample the very high incomes (which make up a large fraction of 
total income). Hence when the income share of the top incomes changes, such survey 
measures will understate the real changes in inequality.  
 
In fact, the increase in top incomes in the U.S. has been dramatic. In the late 1970s, the 
richest 1 % in the U.S. earned about 8 % of the national income – a number that compared 
well to the situation in France (Piketty, 2003). By the end of the 1990s, as much as 14.6 % of 
total U.S. incomes was concentrated in the hands of the top 1 %. In contrast, in France the 
share remained between 7 and 8 percent throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Piketty and Saez 
(2003) show also numbers for the U.K. that underline that the U.S. experience was 
extraordinary: In the U.K. top incomes increased slightly but still remained at levels that are 
close to the French numbers. The U.S. picture is even more dramatic if we look at top 0.1 % 
and the top 0.01% incomes. The share of the former was 6% (3 times as high as in the 1970s) 
in 1998 and the share of the latter group was 2.6 % of total U.S. income (5 times as high as in 
the 1970s). Piketty and Saez (2003) suggest that this is primarily caused by strong increases 
in top wage incomes. In addition, the decline in progressive taxation since the early 1980s 
may have contributed to the increase.   9
 




To get a sense of these numbers, let us make a simple calculation. The U.S. as a whole 
produce about 22 % of the world production (measured in purchasing power parities (PPP); 
World Development Report 2003). This means that the U.S. top 1 % earn about 3.1 % of 
total world income. Compare this to the aggregate income earned by the total population on 
the African continent (Northern plus Sub-Saharian Africa). Measured in PPP terms, the total 
African production amounts to about 3.6 % of world production. In other words, the richest 1 
% in the U.S. can purchase almost as many good as the total African population and about 30 
% more than the Sub-Saharian population. Clearly, the increase in the U.S. top income share 
is dramatic and sizeable even when viewed from a global perspective. 
 
In sum, our look at the data suggests that:  
 
(i)  Inequality in most European countries is considerably smaller than in the U.S. 




























(iii)  Inequality has increased more strongly in the U.S. than in Europe over the last 
two decades. 
(iv)  There has been a dramatic increase in U.S. top incomes. No such increase took 
place in Europe. 
 
Observations (i) to (iii) are based on survey data, which underestimate distributional changes 
resulting from a higher concentration among the top incomes. Taking this into account the 




3.  Macroeconomic performance: Stagnating Europe and dynamic U.S.? 
 
In the last Section we have seen that Europe and the U.S. are quite different in terms of 
inequality. How about their relative growth performance?  
 
Much of the recent economic policy debate is about why Europe is lagging behind the U.S. in 
terms of economic growth. In fact, a first look at the data suggests that recently the U.S. did 
much better than the European countries. The growth rate of real GDP between 1992 and 
2000 was 3.7 % in the U.S. but only 2.1 % in the EU-15 (Blanchard, 2003). The picture 
seems to be confirmed when we look at long-term growth rates. The average growth of real 
GDP between 1960 and 2000 was 3.5 % in the U.S. and only 3.1 % in the EU-15. Can we 
conclude that both the recent and as well as the long-term growth performance of the U.S. 
economy dominated the one of Europe?  
 
Clearly, to answer this question, it does not suffice to look at growth rates of aggregate 
income, but we have to consider growth rates of per-capita incomes (if we are interested in 
the standard of living of the average individual) or at growth rates of output per hours 
worked (if we are interested in the productivity of the average worker). In a recent and 
widely recognized paper, Gordon (2002) shows how these variables evolved over the very 
long term. To compare the growth performance of Europe and the U.S. the productivity 
growth is the variable of primary interest, so we will focus on the long-term changes in 
output per hours worked. Figure 3 shows the increase in this variable for both Europe and the 
U.S. over the past 150 years. Gordon’s numbers suggest that the U.S. were leading Europe   11
already in the second half of the 19
th century, and that this gap continuously widened until 
World War II (WWII). Since then, however, GDP per hours worked has grown much faster 
in Europe. Between 1950 and 1973, the annual productivity growth rate in Europe was 1,8 % 
higher the one in the U.S. And even in the more recent past, between 1973 and 2000, 
productivity growth rates in Europe were by more than 1 % larger than the ones in the U.S. 
As a result, labor productivity in Europe has reached U.S. levels by the mid 1990s.
2  
 

















This evidence seems to be in stark contrast to the perceptions by the public. This is also noted 
in a recent comment in the “Economist” (Economics Focus, February 8
th 2003): 
 
“America’s much trumpeted productivity miracle in the late 1990s created the misleading 
impression that Europe significantly lags America in the productivity league. It is true that, 
since 1995, American GDP per hours worked has risen by an annual average of 1.9 %, 
compared with only 1.3 % in the European Union. However, over any longer period, up to 
half a century, Europe’s productivity growth has outpaced America’s.” 
 
                                                 
2 In fact, numbers presented in Gordon (2002, p.39) suggest that productivity levels in the year 2000, compared 
to the U.S. were 6 % higher in Belgium, 4 % higher in France, and 2 % higher in the Netherlands. The German 




While US-European differences in productivity per working hour have disappeared by the 
end of the 20
th century, significant differences in incomes per capita remain. According to 
Gordon (2002), U.S. per capita incomes diverged already from 1820 on and the highest 
difference was reached after the WWII. Since then there is convergence, but still the 
European incomes per capita have reached only 77 % of U.S. levels today.  
Given identical hourly productivities, any differences in incomes per-capita are, by 
definition, due to differences in hours worked per-capita. These differences can be explained 
by the following observations: (i) labor force participation is much lower in Europe than in 
the U.S. (which partly reflects the demographic structure of the population); the average 
European worker (ii) has a shorter working week; (iii) takes more vacation; and (iv) enjoys 
more work-free holidays. Parts of these different outcomes are due to workers’ voluntary 
choices. Once we attach a monetary value to these kinds of leisure, a substantial part of the 
difference in per capita income between Europe and the U.S. will disappear.  
 
 
4.  Inequality and Growth: evidence and some explanations 
 
The long-term record in terms of income inequality and long-term productivity growth of 
Europe and the U.S. is very clear: Europe had lower income inequality and a better long-term 
productivity growth record than the U.S. In other words, lower income inequality seems to 
go hand in hand with larger productivity progress. Can we argue, more generally, that 
inequality is beneficial for (productivity) growth? What does the recent macroeconomic 
literature have to say about the relationship between these two variables?  
 
Recent theories as well as cross country evidence suggested that a more even income 
distribution may be an important determinant of long-term growth rates.
3 Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) presented empirical evidence that, both in a 
cross-section of countries and in long time series, high levels of initial inequality are 
associated with low subsequent long-run growth rates. Recent evidence by Engermann and 
Sokoloff (2002) compares inequality in Northern and Southern America and impressively 
                                                 
3 See Falkinger (1997) for a stimulating discussion of many arguments that were put forth in the literature.    13
demonstrates the strong and long-lasting effects of inequality on long-run economic 
development of Northern and Southern American economies. The empirical literature based 
on cross-country regressions clearly suggests that initial income and wealth inequality has a 
significantly negative impact on long-run growth rates. The view of the World Bank (stated 
on the webpage of the World Bank Network of Inequality, Poverty and Socio-economic 
Performance) is  
 
 “ … while initial income inequality may not directly affect an economy’s aggregate growth 
potential, other things being equal, it does proxy for more fundamental inequalities of wealth. 
Once measures for those are included, there seems to be a significant negative relationship 
between asset inequality and growth.” 
 
What do recent economic theories tell us about the relationship between income inequality 
and the macroeconomic growth performance of economies? Persson and Tabellini (1994) 
suggest the following explanation. High inequality in pre-tax incomes leads the majority of 
people to support redistribution by means of a progressive tax system. Inequality is bad for 
growth, because such taxation is detrimental to investment incentives. 
 
The available empirical evidence, however, does not support the above model. First, in cross-
country data there is no statistically significant impact of inequality on taxes and transfers. 
Secondly, there is very little evidence that redistribution has a detrimental impact on 
investment and growth. Whether or not higher taxes have an impact on growth and investment 
depends on how the tax revenues are spent: The transfer/GDP ratio and the fraction of public 
expenditures on education frequently have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
growth. 
 
There are further plausible reasons for a negative inequality-growth relationship that are more 
consistent with the evidence. One such explanation is that inequality, if not mitigated by 
public redistribution measures, leads to political instability, which has a negative impact on 
the economy’s growth rate. The more recent literature goes a step further and asks how social 
capital, trust and the degree of acceptance of social norms can promote economic growth.
 It is 
evident that in explaining the determinants of these factors, the distribution of income and 
wealth has an important role to play. 
 
   14
5.  Inequality and the Accumulation of Human Capital  
 
However, the dominant explanation put forth in the recent literature is neither based on 
politico-economic nor on sociological explanations. This approach is based on the argument 
that imperfect capital markets may lead to severe efficiency losses when there is excessive 
inequality. For evident reasons, the accumulation of human capital plays a central role in 
explaining the growth process of modern economies.  
 
The argument is simple: Education not only causes direct costs but is also a period without 
income. Individuals who lack the necessary funds and cannot raise these funds on the capital 
market have only limited access to the education system. Low-ability children of rich parents 
will get educated, whereas poor high-ability individuals will not, resulting in an inefficient 
allocation of talents. 
 
The crucial point can be made in Figure 4. On the horizontal axis, we measure the level of 
human capital investment of a certain individual. The vertical axis shows the output level 
resulting from this investment. For simplicity, let us further assume that the relationship 
between investment and output is the same for all individuals (which means that all 
individuals are of equal ability).    15
 












The optimal investment level equates the marginal return of an additional year of education 
to the interest rate. In Figure 4 this is the case at investment level H*. When capital markets 
are imperfect, this may not be feasible for many individuals. The rich can invest the optimal 
amount H*, whereas the amount of education that the poor can invest is lower, HA. If the 
marginal returns are decreasing in the level of investment the wealth distribution affects the 
equilibrium outcome. The per-capita income of next period – the weighted average of Y* and 
YA in Figure 4 – is lower, the larger the fraction of individuals for whom credit restriction 
become binding. Ceteris paribus, this fraction will be larger with a higher degree of 
inequality. 
While capital market imperfections are certainly an argument that is of tremendous 
importance in developing countries, it is less clear how severe such capital market 
imperfections are in developed economies. Recent evidence by Cameron and Heckman 
(1999) suggests that educational outcomes are primarily determined by the social background 
– the family and the neighborhood in which an individual has grown up.  
 
The truth lies most likely somewhere in between. In fact, a number of theoretical 
contributions, including Benabou (1996) and Durlauf (1996) demonstrate that if there are 
neighborhood effects in the accumulation of human capital (for instance, richer 
neighborhoods provide better schools) limited access to capital markets may lead to such 
segregation of the population by income thus reinforcing the importance of neighborhood 
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persistent inequalities. Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss (1996) suggest further that status 
concerns associated with education may exacerbate such adverse inequality effects. Put in 
other terms, social background and imperfect capital markets are complementary rather than 
competing explanations. Whatever the particular channel, income inequality is a primary 
determinant of educational choices. 
 
Do such theories help to explain U.S. and European differences in long-run productivity 
growth? First of all, it takes time for the process of human capital accumulation to manifest 
itself in productivity changes. The effects of inequality on educational choices are also long-
term. A change in inequality today will have worked out its final effect not before the 
children of the youngest parents that are affected by the inequality change will have to make 
their education decision. Both observations suggest that we have to adopt a long-term 
perspective. In fact, we have seen that there are long-run differences in productivity growth 
between Europe and the U.S. Moreover, there are persistent differences in income inequality 
which most likely have widened recently. 
 
Due to higher inequality, constraints in educational choices due to capital market 
imperfections are more severe in the U.S. than in Europe. Note also that such constraints are 
exacerbated by institutional differences in the education systems. In the U.S., education has 
comparably high private costs, in particular for higher education. The typical U.S. student 
has to pay high tuition fees. At primary and secondary education levels, the decreasing 
quality of U.S. public schools lead many richer parents to send their kids to (costly) private 
high schools – an option that is not available to poorer families. In contrast, in most 
European countries, access to university education is free (or cheap). While private schools 
are also widespread in some countries, lower European inequality implies that financing 
constraints may be less severe and widespread misallocation of talent is less likely.
4 
 
In sum, to the extent that better incentives for the accumulation of human capital are relevant 
for the superior (productivity) growth performance of Europe over the long run, lower 
income inequality may have contributed to that outcome. 
                                                 
4 Results from the PISA-study of the OECD suggest that the performance of pupils in the U.S. corresponds to 
the average of other OECD countries. Moreover, there is evidence that the variance in student performance with 
respect to certain skills (in particular, literacy skills) have a higher variance in the U.S. than in most European 
countries. Note that this is in line with our reasoning: Despite higher per-capita incomes, education outcomes 
are not higher on average, and have a larger variance, than in lower-income and lower-inequality European 
countries. 
   17
 
 
6. Imperfect  Competition  on Product Markets:  
Inequality and Innovation Incentives  
 
In the above models, the distribution of income and wealth affects the returns to 
accumulation and tomorrow’s supply with factors of production. The demand for produced 
output plays a passive role. This is a convenient (while simplifying) assumption for many 
purposes. However, few economists would contradict the proposition that the expected level 




Income inequality comes into play, because consumer behavior is strongly determined by 
income. Consumers with different levels of income do not only spend different total amounts 
on consumption goods they also have a different structure of consumption. For instance, 
poor consumers will not only purchase (normal) goods in smaller quantity but will also 
purchase a different (smaller and lower quality) bundle of goods than the rich.
6 As a 
consequence, the market demand for the various (in particular, new) products will depend on 
the income distribution. Hence income distribution may have an important effect on the 
incentives to innovate. To the extent that such innovations are a crucial source of 
technological progress, income distribution is a determinant of productivity growth.  
 
To illustrate those mechanisms let us consider in more detail how income distribution affects 
the demand for new products: Suppose consumers have hierarchic preferences and 
concentrate their consumption expenditures on basic goods, before they start to buy 
conveniences and luxury goods. As a result, innovators will attract primarily rich buyers 
whereas poor consumers will not (immediately) be able to afford new goods. This leads to 
the presumption that a class of very rich people generates the necessary demand for new 
products. In fact, the idea that the consumption of luxury goods is an important engine of 
                                                 
5 There are only few theoretical studies that have explored the implications the role of income distribution for the 
incentives to innovate. Among these, studies are Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, (1989), Falkinger (1990, 1994) 
and Chou and Talmain (1996), and Matsuyama (2002). For empirical evidence on the importance of non-
homothetic preferences, see Jackson (1984) and Falkinger and Zweimüller (1996). 
6 While this is an obvious point, it should be noted that existing macroeconomic models that deal with many 
products (to explain the process of innovations and growth) assume homothetic preferences. Under this 
assumption a consumer is half as rich as some other consumer purchases exactly half of the same goods as the 
richer consumer. As a result income distribution is irrelevant for market demand.   18
growth by creating new wants and maintaining incentives to provide effort also for the lower 
classes, is an argument which has already be stressed by the classical economists. 
 
Can we argue that inequality is good for growth because it induces innovations? The answer 
is: not necessarily. The reason is that there is a trade-off between prices (which are high 
when a class of very rich people has a very high willingness to pay for new products) and 
market size (which will be low when incomes are strongly concentrated among a few rich). 
Moreover, what matters for innovators are not only profits today, but also how the market for 
the new product evolves in the future. Obviously, a more equal distribution of income is 
favorable in this respect. When there is a well-funded middle class market size rises quickly 
and fosters innovation incentives. In sum, it is a priori not clear whether positive price effects 
of high inequality outweigh the negative (static and dynamic) market size effects. Whether 
inequality is good or bad for growth strongly depends on whether or not there exist close 
substitutes for the new goods.
7  
 
The above mechanism is the most obvious by which income distribution can affect 
innovations, but it is not the only one. Industrial R&D activities are to a large extent targeted 
towards better quality of existing products.
8 With a very skewed income distribution, the rich 
have a high willingness to pay for luxurious products, and innovators may target 
predominantly goods that are purchased by the rich. In such a situation, less R&D resources 
will be channeled into the improvement of mass production technologies. However, without 
substantial technological improvements in such mass consumption industries, that exploit 
economies of scale, productivity progress will be slow.  
 
Furthermore, with a more even distribution of incomes, demand will be distributed more 
evenly across industries. This makes it easier for new methods of production to penetrate all 
industries in the economy. As a result, the dissemination of knowledge may be easier when 
there is a sizeable middle class. 
 
                                                 
7 If there are close substitutes for the innovators’ products positive price effects of high inequality will not be 
strong, because innovators face higher competition form those close substitutes. In such a situation inequality is 
detrimental to innovation incentives (Zweimüller, 2000). If substitution possibilities are limited, the rich have a 
high willingness to pay for new products (Foellmi and Zweimüller, 2002) and price effects dominate the market 
size effects.  
8 See Zweimüller and Brunner, 1998, Li 1996, and Glass, 1996 for models where income distribution affects the 
incentive of innovators to introduce better quality of existing products.   19
These arguments may have played an important role to explain the exceptional catch-up that 
took place over the long run. During WWI and WWII the capital stock was destroyed and 
with it much of the sources of income inequality. In the 19
th century, European incomes were 
distributed less equally than in the U.S. Ironically, a number of economic historians have 
pointed to the importance of the rather egalitarian U.S. income distribution to explain the 
superior performance of the U.S. over the second half of the 19
th century. Abramovitz and 
David (2000) note 
 
“In all the European countries, a traditional class structure – which separated a nobility and 
gentry form the peasantry, the tradesmen, and an expanding middle class – survived in the 
19
th century. (…) Aristocratic standards of quality and individuality in consumption worked 
to inhibit the development of standardized goods and mass production, and they supported an 
extreme fragmentation of retail trade.” 
 
The dramatic recent changes in income distribution in the U.S. seem to have important 
implications for the structure of aggregate consumer demand. How this will affect the 
innovation incentives will, to a large extent, depend on how the new rich will spend their 
income. Will this stimulate innovations of completely new products and the invention of new 
technologies that can ultimately applied economy wide? Or are we back in a situation where 
the very rich (now those in the U.S.) use their income to satisfy the same “aristocratic 
standards of quality and individuality in consumption” that has hampered technological 
development in the Europe of the 19
th century?
9 To the extent that a less egalitarian 
consumption structure leads to a lower potential for exploiting economies of scale and a 
slower dissemination of new technologies across all sectors, the increase in inequality may 
have detrimental effects on productivity growth in the future.  
 
These are very important questions and they are equally hard to answer. So far, very little 
empirical research has been done about to role of inequality in determining the extent and 
types of innovations that are conducted in the economy. Among the few studies is Kremer 
(2002) who showed that income distribution and market size is of crucial importance in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
 
                                                 
9 Frank (2000) and many others have pointed to the “luxury fever” and the dramatic changes in consumer 
behavior (“conspicuous consumption”) that have been observed in the U.S. in recent decades. 
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One might object that the above arguments are less important today as many firms operate on 
global markets. In that case, the global distribution of income rather than the distribution of 
income within countries matters. This is clearly the case for tradable goods. And to the extent 
that productivity growth is driven by innovations in those industries, the income distribution 
within countries is indeed less important.  
 
However, there are a number of reasons why home markets matter even in the global 
economy. First of all, many products are non-tradable, in particular in the service sector. By 
definition, these products are produced and sold in the home market and their market demand 
will depend on the distribution of income within the home country. Second, if transportation 
costs are substantial, markets are segmented by geographical distance. In that case the 
geographical borders coincide to a large extent with national borders. Third, substantial legal 
trade barriers still exist. The mere fact that huge efforts have been undertaken to convince 
European citizens to remove these barriers Europe underlines their importance. Even if no 
such barriers existed within Europe (and within the U.S.) significant trade barriers exist 
across these areas. Hence the distribution within Europe as a whole within the U.S. as a 
whole (and less so the global distribution of income) matters for many producers. Fourth, the 
trade volume between Europe and the U.S. is relatively small compared to aggregate output 
of these economic areas. In other words, most production within Europe is sold within 
Europe, and the same is true for the U.S. Finally, even in a world with no trade barriers and 
transportation costs the home market may be important, simply because consumers’ 
preferences are biased towards products of the own country.  
 
 
7. Conclusions   
 
In this paper we have looked at differences in macroeconomic outcomes between European 
countries and the U.S. and have discussed these differences in the context of income 
inequality. 
 
Since the 1950s, Europe had the clearly better record in terms of productivity progress. By 
the mid 1990s many European countries have reached U.S. levels of productivity and some 
European countries are even more productive than the U.S. Since the mid 1990s, productivity 
growth in Europe lags somewhat behind the one of the U.S. but the recent (negative)   21
difference is small compared to the previous positive gap. Recent empirical evidence 
concerning income inequality suggests that inequality in the U.S. is considerably higher than 
in most European countries, and perhaps also higher than in Europe as a whole. Furthermore, 
the recent dramatic increase in U.S. top incomes suggests that the gap between Europe and 
the U.S. has dramatically widened along this dimension.  
 
We have used arguments from the recent macroeconomic literature to interpret this empirical 
evidence. In particular, we were asking whether a even distribution of income is harmful or 
beneficial for productivity growth. While there are many potential channels by which income 
distribution might have affected, we have concentrated our discussion on two channels which 
seem to be of particular importance in modern economies: Human capital accumulation when 
there are imperfections in capital markets; and the effect of inequality on innovation 
incentives.  
 
This analysis suggests that lower income inequality in Europe may have contributed to larger 
productivity progress. Other things equal, less inequality implies less restrictions in the 
accumulation of human capital. To the extent that productivity growth is driven by the 
accumulation of human capital this may have been an advantage for Europe. Similar 
arguments can be made for innovation incentives. An income distribution that is less skewed 
towards top incomes may foster innovations and the adoption and dissemination of new 
technologies.  
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